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All attorneys in the United States are required to comply with the code
of professional responsibility adopted by their jurisdiction. These codes all
contain a confidentiality principle forbidding disclosure of a client's confi-
dential communications. Because attorneys cannot properly advise their cli-
ents without knowledge of all the facts, the confidentiality principle
theoretically insures full disclosure by assuring the client that confidential
communications will remain secret. Although the confidentiality require-
ment is generally valid, its legitimacy is questionable in a situation where an
attorney is forbidden to disclose an act which has harmed and may continue
to harm an innocent child.
This article discusses an attorney's ethical dilemma when faced with the
confidentiality requirement in light of his client's confessed- incestuous rela-
tionship with the client's nine-year old daughter. Although some states have
enacted legislation and code amendments to encompass this situation, most
jurisdictions have not expressed definitive guidelines for an attorney faced
with this dilemma. The following is a study of an ethics committee in the
mythical state of Marshall exploring three possible courses of action in an





Chairperson, Marshall State Bar Association
Committee on Professional Ethics
Dear Mr. Sage:
I would appreciate an advisory opinion from the Committee on Profes-
sional Ethics on the proper course of conduct in the following situation in
which I am presently involved. Neglect proceedings have been filed against
an indigent family. I have been appointed to represent the mother and fa-
ther at the hearing. The petition alleges that the couple's three children,
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aged three, six and nine, are not receiving proper care. They are dirty and
inadequately fed. I learned from the husband that he has been having sex-
ual intercourse with their nine year old daughter for the past two years. The
wife confirms this and privately tells me that she is afraid to interfere. I have
reviewed the report of the child welfare investigation ordered by the court.
The report, which includes interviews with the children, confirms my belief
that no one except the mother has discovered the father's mistreatment of
the child.
As court-appointed counsel, what are my ethical obligations? Should I
disclose the father's incest? If I do not, I am afraid it will continue. I think
he needs some kind of treatment or therapy. If the court does not appoint
counsel for the children, should I suggest to the court that counsel be ap-
pointed? Even if counsel is appointed, he or she may not find out about the
incest because apparently no one has during the past two years. I suspect
that the child may be afraid to speak up against her father.
I imagine that other lawyers may have been confronted with this kind
of dilemma, but I cannot find any ethics opinions addressing these questions.





MARSHALL STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
Memorandum
TO: Members of the Committee on Professional Ethics
FROM: Lawrence Sage, Chairperson
DATE: January 5, 1984
RE: Inquiry No. 84-1: Disclosure of Confidential Communications
Enclosed are copies of the above-referenced inquiry and supporting
materials. The inquiring lawyer asks:
(1) Whether he should reveal confidential communications that his
client, charged with child neglect, has been having sexual intercourse with
his nine year old daughter for the past two years.
(2) Whether he should suggest to the court that counsel be appointed
for the children.
Contrary to custom, the committee sua sponte will also address a related
question not raised by the inquirer but highly pertinent to his inquiry and a
matter of great public interest.
(3) Whether counsel for the children, if appointed, should reveal con-
fidential communications over the objections of one of his clients, a nine year
old girl, that her father has been having sexual intercourse with her for the
past two years.
Because of the committee's lack of familiarity with the social, medical
and psychological aspects of incest, I have requested briefing reports from
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experts in those areas on the general problems of incest to aid the committee
in reaching a decision. In addition, I have requested reports by a juvenile
court judge and a legal aid attorney on judicial proceedings that might re-
sult from a charge of incest. Enclosed are reports by:
(1) Dr. Hillary Hope, Director, National Children's Protection
League;
(2) Ms. Mary Noble, Supervisor of Caseworkers, Marshall De-
partment of Protection Services;
(3) The Honorable Richard Chancellor, Circuit Court Judge, Ju-
venile Division, State of Marshall; and
(4) Brenda Challenger, Esquire, Chief Staff Counsel, Marshall
City Legal Services, Inc.
Please review these materials and be prepared to discuss and take a prelimi-
nary vote on this inquiry at our committee meeting on January 25.
REPORT ON SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN BY DR. HILLARY HOPE,
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL CHILDREN'S PROTECTION LEAGUE
Child abuse and neglect have reached "epidemic proportions" in this
country.' The federal government has awarded millions of dollars in local
grants to support programs to increase protective services and reporting of
neglect and abuse of children. 2 Yet, one immense and pervasive type of
maltreatment, sexual abuse, 3 has attracted relatively little concern even
among health care professionals. 4 Doctors and psychiatrists routinely label
complaints of incest as mere fantasy.5 A diagnosis of child sexual molesta-
tion makes everyone uncomfortable 6 and many people angry and outraged.
An annual estimate of over 5,000 cases of father-daughter incest7 is con-
sidered the "tip of the iceberg." 8 Only a small fraction are reported when
they happen; most come to light years later.9 Incest occurs within the pri-
vacy of the family and is kept secret, which makes it impossible to know the
real magnitude of the problem. '0 Dr. C. Henry Kempe, pioneer researcher
and a foremost authority on child abuse, described the situation: "It is usu-
ally hidden for years and only becomes known because of some dramatic
change in the family situation, such as adolescent revelation of delinquent
acts, pregnancy, venereal disease, a variety of psychiatric illnesses, or some-
1. A. GREEN, CHILD MALTREATMENT 285 (1980).
2. Id. at 286.
3. De Francis, Protecting the Child Victims of Sex Crimes Committed by Adults, 35 FED. PROBA-
TION, Sept. 1971, at 15, 17.
4. Steele, Psychodynamic Factors in Child Abuse in THE BATTERED CHILD 72 (C. Kernpc &
R. Heifer 3d ed. 1980). See also Sgroi, Sexual Molestation of Children, CHILDREN TODAN'. May-
June 1975, at 18-19.
5. Kempe, Incest and Other Forms of SexualAbuse in THE BATTERED CHILD 198, 198-99 (C.
Kempe & R. Heifer 3d ed. 1980).
6. Id
7. A. GREEN, supra note 1, at 119.
8. Schechter & Roberge, Sexual Exploitation in CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 127, 130 (C.
Kempe & R. Heifer eds. 1976).
9. Kempe, supra note 5, at 198-99.
10. Radbill, Children in a World of Violence:. A Histoy of Child Abuse in THE BATTERED
CHILD 3, 10 (C. Kempe & R. Heifer 3d ed. 1980).
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thing as trivial as a sudden family quarrel." ' "I The acts often continue over
many years and "may be carried out under actual or threatened violence or
may be nonviolent or even tender, insidious, collusive, and secretive."12 Gen-
erally, the whole family actively or passively supports "incestuous
equilibrium.'
13
Authorities believe that incest is increasing.' 4 Factors contributing to
this increase are the loosening of sexual mores, ready availability of birth
control and abortion, and higher divorce and remarriage rates.' 5 Another
factor is generational cycling, a widely recognized phenomenon of sexual
abuse: those abused become the abusers of the next generation. '6 This cycle
is likely to continue unless the family can be helped to function more nor-




The most common form of incest is between father and daughter,' 8
however, father-son, 19 mother-son 20 and mother-daughter 2' incidents have
also been reported, as well as incidents between siblings. 22 Because father-
daughter incest "is potentially the most damaging to the child and family
[and the] most frequently prosecuted by the courts,"'23 my remarks focus
primarily on the father as abuser and the daughter as victim. In that situa-
tion the mother usually is aware of what is happening but does not protest.
24
In fact, she often condones and even aids and abets the crime, 25 perhaps out
of fear of physical violence or of losing her husband, which would leave the
family destitute.26 This places the victim in a vulnerable position, defense-
less27 against paternal threats, force, or enticements. 28  To the child, her
father is a trusted authority figure who "can do no wrong."
29 This gives him
great power over her. Vincent De Francis, Director of the Children's Divi-
11. Kempe, supra note 5, at 198-99.
12. Id. at 198.
13. Schechter & Roberge, supra note 8, at 129.
14. Kempe, supra note 5, at 204.
15. See id. See also Schechter & Roberge, supra note 8, at 130.
16. De Francis, supra note 3, at 20. See also A. GREEN, supra note 1, at 38, 88, 285.
17. Incest and Family Disorder, BRIT. MED. J., May 13, 1972, 364, 365. See also Steele, supra
note 4, at 73.
18. "Seventy-eight percent of all reported incest involves father-daughter; eighteen percent
sibling; 1 percent mother-son; and the remainder, multiple relationships within the family."
Schechter & Roberge, supra note 8, at 131. See, e.g., Adams & Neel, Children of Incest, 40 PEDIAT-
RICS 55, 57-58 (1967) (reporting statistical findings).
19. See, e.g., Bender & Blau, The Reaction of Children to Sexual Relations With Adults, 7 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 500, 502 (1937).
20. See, e.g., Yorukoglu & Kemph, Children Not Severely Damaged by Incest With a Parent, 5 J.
AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 111 (1966).
21. Id. at 112.
22. See, e.g., Adams & Neel, supra note 18, at 57.
23. Giarretto, H-umanistic Treatment of Father-Daughter Incest, in CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
143, 146 (C. Kempe & R. Heifer eds. 1976).
24. De Francis, supra note 3, at 19.
25. Id See also A. GREEN, supra note 1, at 51, 120; Kempe, supra note 5, at 205.
26. De Francis, supra note 3, at 16-17.
27. Kempe, supra note 5, at 209.
28. De Francis, supra note 3, at 18.
29. Peters, Children Who Were Victims of Sexual Assault and the Psychology of Offenders, 30 AM. J.
PSYCHOTHERAPY 398, 411 (1976).
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sion of the American Humane Association, described the psychodynamics in
a report on a three year study of sexual abuse he directed in New York City:
"The offender used the child's strong desire not to displease him, even
though, to the child, the adult's request may have seemed unpleasant, or
distasteful, or even bizarre. . . . A subtle threat underlies the compliance of
the child in these circumstances. "30 Can the child really be considered a
"willing victim ' 3 ' under these circumstances, or "not always [an] unwilling"
partner, 32 as some commentators assert?
When the mother sides with the father against the child victim, the
child feels isolated and helpless and is usually plagued by feelings of insecu-
rity, confusion, guilt and worthlessness since she does not know where to turn
for help. 33 For older children the dilemma is staggering because they realize
that the reaction to confiding this information may be disbelief, anger, ostra-
cism or maybe even destruction of the family. Dr. Kempe said:
They are in no way assured of ready help from anyone, but risk
losing their family and feeling guilty and responsible for bringing it
harm if they share their secret. Youngsters may only come to the
attention of the health care system or the law through pregnancy,
prostitution, veneral disease, drug abuse, or antisocial behavior.
34
When parents are confronted with their roles in the wrongdoings, some
deny the incest, rationalize it, or even shrug it off. One mother responded
that her husband "gave up smoking and needed something to help him
through." '35 Some offenders righteously defend the incest as natural, 36 the
right of a parent, 37 or good for the child. 38 A frequent defense is that the
child seduced the parent. 39 Although some observers give credence to this
charge, recent researchers view the child's behavior as innocent affection-
seeking,4° and place the entire responsibility for setting appropriate limits of
family intimacy on the parents. 4' If parents do not set appropriate limits, or
if a father's perception and inhibitions are weakened by the use of alcohol or
drugs, he may introduce sex in response to the child's simple affection-seek-
ing behavior and wrongly blame the child for seducing him.42 In a study of
sexual abusers of children referred for psychiatric evaluation, the researcher
discounted the child's role as an important external circumstance inducing
the sexual maltreatment.
43
30. De Francis, supra note 3, at 18.
31. Schechter & Roberge, supra note 8, at 141.
32. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
63 (1979).
33. See Peters, supra note 29, at 418.
34. Kempe, supra note 5, at 208.
35. Schechter & Roberge, supra note 8, at 132.
36. Summit & Kryso, Sexual Abuse of Children: A Clinical Spectrum, 48 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHI-
ATRY 237, 242 (1978).
37. Id at 245.
38. Steele, supra note 4, at 74.
39. Id.
40. See Peters, supra note 29, at 411-12.
41. Summit & Kryso, supra note 36, at 239.
42. See Peters, supra note 29, at 411.
43. Swanson, Adult Sexual Abuse of Children, 29 DISEASES NERVOUS SYSTEM 677-78 (1968).
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The impact of parental incest on the victim is hard to assess because
many of the more serious problems do not appear until years later, 44 and
because there is a paucity of carefully controlled long-term studies of incest
victims. 4 5 Most clinical studies, however, have reported a variety of distur-
bances ranging from personality disorders,
46 psychosomatic complaints,
47
psychological difficulties and sexual maladjustments48  to full-blown
psychoses. 4 9 A number of studies on incest and sexual abuse of children show
that the fact that the child was the victim of a trusted and respected figure
causes confusion, distrust and psychiatric disorders later in life.50 -One team
of researchers said, "It is the recognition of having been exploited and un-
cared for as an individual human being that leads to the long-lasting
residual damages of sexual abuse in development, rather than the actual
physical sexual act itself.' ' 51 Pregnancy, vaginitis and syphilis were among
the physical effects suffered by some incest victims, 52 but the psychological
effects may have been even more serious. While depression and guilt were
prevalent, 53 fatigue, loss of appetite, aches and pains, inability to concen-
trate and sleep disturbances were psychosomatic complaints suffered by al-
most all victims in one study of father-daughter incest.
54
Researchers Bender and Blau found immediate harmful effects on per-
sonality development that varied with the developmental stages of the
child.55 Some children showed reversion to or prolonged infantile behavior,
others showed handicapped educability and social adaptations, while still
others showed precocious and inappropriate development of adolescent
characteristics and adjustment difficulties. 56 The researchers also found anx-
iety and confusion in the victims' social relations, and concluded that incest
distorted their attitudes toward family members and, later, toward society in
general.
57
The turmoil these children endure may not, however, be recognized at
the time of the incident because children frequently repress the experience.
58
They may be emotionally withdrawn and appear unaffected by the rape,
but repression frequently results in psychological problems5 9 which are man-
44. Peters, supra note 29, at 417.
45. A. GREEN, Supra note 1, at 124.
46. Yorukoglu & Kemph, supra note 20, at 11I.
47. Lewis & Sarrel, Some Psychological Aspects of Seduction, Incest, and Rape in Childhood, 8 J.
AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 606, 613 (1969).
48. Yorukoglu & Kemph, supra note 20 at 111.
49. Id.
50. Steele, supra note 4, at 75; Peters, supra note 29, at 418.
51. Steele, supra note 4, at 75.
52. A. GREEN, supra note 1, at 123. See also Bender & Blau, supra note 19, at 502.
53. Kaufman, Peck & Tagiuri, The Family Constellation and Overt Incestuous Relations Between
Father and Daughter, 24 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 266 (1954).
54. Id
55. Bender & Blau, supra note 19, at 516.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Sloane & Karpinski, Effects of Incest On the Participants, 12 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY
666 (1942).
59. Peters, supra note 29, at 420.
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ifested in unsatisfying personal and sexual relationships later in life. 60 Yet,
some researchers fail to appreciate the seriousness of "the interpersonal im-
pairment the child has suffered because the victim remains in the same fam-
ily group with the offender and silently tolerates repeated assaults."'6'
Furthermore, "[e]ven if the assaults themselves are not repeated, there can
be extensive psychologic difficulties if the victim and the offender remain
living in the same household when the victim goes through adolescence,"
62
because anxiety impairs the functioning of the ego.63 Researchers have
found that disturbance of the parent-child relationship jeopardized the
child's development, and that "[tihe underlying craving for an adequate
parent, then, dominated the lives of these girls."
'64
"In cases of father-daughter incest, the psychopathology of the daugh-
ters ranged from severe personality disorder and sexual maladjustment to
manifest psychosis."'65 Studies show that their problems have also included
drug addictions, 66 prostitution 67 and homosexuality. 68 With consequences
of such magnitude, every effort must be made to educate parents and to
protect children from sexual abuse at the hands of their trusted caretakers.
For those children who have been victimized, enlightened and sensitive pro-
grams of therapy and treatment must be provided to help salvage their
young lives. Reporting child abuse should be everyone's responsibility.
REPORT ON SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN
BY Ms. MARY NOBLE, SUPERVISOR OF CASEWORKERS,
MARSHALL DEPARTMENT OF PROTECTIVE
SERVICES
The increasing child abuse caseload is placing heavy demands on com-
munity resources to provide protective and rehabilitative services to the
child and the family.69 Ideally, the community should provide the family
with support services such as caseworkers; visiting nurses; visiting homemak-
ers; child day care; mental health services, including individual and group
counseling; and short and long-term therapy for the victim, parents and sib-
lings under social services supervision. 70 When home-based services and
treatment are not available, foster care and court action may be the only
recourse. 7 1 The immediate concern should be the victim's safety which may
require removal, at least temporarily, to a children's shelter or foster home,
particularly if the offender remains in the family home.7 2 Removal from the
60. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 32, at 63.
61. Peters, supra note 29, at 412.
62. Id.
63. Lewis & Sarrel, supra note 47, at 619.
64. Kaufman, Peck & Tagiuri, supra note 53, at 277.
65. Yorukoglu & Kemph, supra note 20, at 111.
66. Giarretto, supra note 23, at 146.
67. Kempe, supra note 5, at 208.
68. Yorukoglu & Kemph, supra note 20, at I 11.
69. A. GREEN, supra note 1, at 137.
70. See id. at 288.
71. See id. at 10, 218, 234. See also Newberger & Bourne, The Medcazation and Legalization of
Chd Abuse, 48 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 593, 595, 603 (1978).
72. See Peters, supra note 29, at 419.
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family, even temporarily, may cause the child to feel rejected, banished, un-
loved and insecure which compounds the guilt and shame already felt.
73
The child needs competent counseling or treatment to deal with this stress
and inner-turmoil.
74
Intervention by the state has distinct and predictable consequences for
every member of the family. Examination of the victim in a hospital or
clinic may be required, which can be a bewildering and frightening experi-
ence for a child. Recounting details of the assault to police and intake of-
ficers in what may be an insensitive interrogation, can make the victim feel
badgered, threatened and demeaned.
75
For the family, state intervention invariably engenders shame, humilia-
tion and hostility at having their private lives open to public view and cen-
sure, plus resentment toward the victim for causing this intrusion.
76
Protective measures, viewed by professionals as helpful to a family in crisis,
may seem punitive and vindictive to family members.
77
State intervention for the offender means community indignation and
outrage, the stigma of being labeled "unfit" or "abusive" and, perhaps ulti-
mately, the retribution of the criminal justice system. 78 If convicted and
imprisoned, the offender may be threatened and assaulted by inmates who
regard child abusers as the lowest kind of criminal.79 Furthermore, if the
offender is acquitted of criminal abuse charges, he may feel vindicated and
justified in resuming the incest 80 or punishing the victim by unreasonable
chores and demands, oppressive rules, restrictions, sanctions, and other forms
of blatant or subtle harassment. 8 '
If the victim remains in the home or is later restored to the family, she
may be shunned, ostracized or tormented by her parents and siblings for
causing so much trouble and embarrassment for the family, thus reinforcing
her feelings of guilt, unworthiness and low self-esteem.
82
The abuse charges may be followed by proceedings to terminate paren-
tal rights. The judicial process, whether criminal or civil, makes adversaries
of family members by requiring them to testify against each other.83 Ques-
tioning the victim about details of the assault, testifying, and being cross-
examined may be as harrowing and harmful as the incest itself, if not more
SO.
8 4
73. See Sgroi, supra note 4, at 21. See also A. GREEN, supra note l, at 219.
74. See A. GREEN, supra note 1, at 187. See also Johnson, The Sexually Mistreated Child- Diag-
nostic Evaluation in THE ABUSED CHILD IN THE FAMILY AND THE COMMUNITY 943, 949 (C.
Kernpe, A. Franklin & C. Cooper eds. 1980).
75. See De Francis, supra note 3, at 17.
76. A. GREEN, supra note 1, at 227. See also Giarretto, supra note 23, at 148.
77. Newberger & Bourne, supra note 71, at 602.
78. Id at 601.
79. Incest and Family Disorder, supra note 17, at 365.
80. Newberger & Bourne, supra note 71, at 600. See also Duquette, Liberty and Lawyers bi
Child Protection in THE BATTERED CHILD 316, 317 (C. Kempe & R. Heifer 3d ed. 1980).
81. Giarretto, supra note 23, at 144.
82. Id
83. Schechter & Roberge, supra note 8, at 129.
84. De Francis, supra note 3, at 17.
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Once the judicial process is invoked, the outcome is unpredictable. At
worst, from the family's viewpoint, the offender may be imprisoned, the wife
and children made destitute, the victim removed from the loved ones' home
and placed with strangers, and parental rights terminated.8 5 At best, with
good family support resources, a humane and enlightened program tailored
to the individual family may provide the treatment and therapy necessary to
stop the incest, protect the child, rehabilitate the offender, and stabilize and
reunite the family, which should be the ultimate goal. 8 6 When it succeeds,
state intervention is vindicated, but when it fails, harm and suffering may be
compounded. It is incumbent upon the community to provide the resources
and upon professionals to work together to make it succeed.
CHILD ABUSE AND THE LEGAL PROCESS: A JUDGE'S PERSPECTIVE
By HONORABLE RICHARD CHANCELLOR, CIRCUIT COURT
JUDGE, JUVENILE DIVISION, STATE OF MARSHALL
Because of the very nature of the offense and the almost certain
danger to the child, any known cause of apparent child battering
should be brought into the legal process of investigation, referral to
court and a court proceeding.
The quality of this process determines the kind of results ob-
tained. To deal effectively with child abuse, all parts of the system
must have the same goals. These include the immediate protection
of the child, ascertaining the reasons for parental abuse, treatment
of such causes and, ultimately, a permanent return of the child to a
well-adjusted home, preferably his own.
Judge James J. Delaney
8 7
Several types of laws are designed to protect children from abuse.
Criminal statutes and ordinances can be invoked to punish offenders. Under
juvenile or family court acts, the court may institute protective supervision
or termination of parental rights when parents are found to have abused or
neglected their children. Protective services are part of public child welfare
laws in most states and all states have laws that require reporting known or
suspected child abuse or neglect. 88
Criminal statutes protect children from sexual misconduct, such as stat-
utory rape, indecent liberties, incest, and sexual battery.89 Once set in mo-
tion, the criminal process is "formidable, impersonal and unrelenting .... ;
its aim is primarily punitive rather than therapeutic. "90 The process usually
begins with an information filed by a public prosecutor, followed by an ar-
rest warrant, arraignment at which the offender receives formal notice of the
charges and of his rights, including court-appointed counsel for indigent de-
fendants, and posting bond or release on his own recognizance pending
85. See Kempe, supra note 5 at 199. See also Giarretto supra note 23, at 144.
86. See Kempe, supra note 5, at 209.
87. Delaney, The Battered Child and the Law in HELPING THE BATTERED CHILD AND HIS
FAMILY 187, 198-99 (C. Kempe & R. Helfer eds. 1972).
88. Paulsen, The Law andAbused Children in THE BATrERED CHILD 175, 175-76 (R. Heifer
& C. Kempe eds. 1968).
89. Delaney, supra note 87, at 188.
90. Id at 189.
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trial.9 1 After investigation by the prosecution and defense counsel, the court
may accept a plea bargain. "Depending on the strength or weakness of the
state's evidence, the severity of the injury and the public climate, the prose-
cutor may agree" to reduce the charge to a lesser offense in exchange for a
plea of guilty, for example, from felonious assault to simple assault, a
misdemeanor.
92
After a "guilty" plea or conviction following a trial, the defendant may
apply for probation if he is not a persistent offender. A presentence or pro-
bation investigation is usually conducted and may include psychological or
psychiatric evaluation, but seldom delves into the underlying cause of the
abuse or proposes a positive plan for supervision or treatment of the of-
fender. 93 Probation services seldom have any therapeutic effect because per-
sonnel usually are not trained to understand or deal constructively with the
pathology of child abuse. This deficiency and the repugnancy of the crime
often result merely in punitive, restrictive surveillance, making rehabilitation
improbable under the criminal justice system. Judge Delaney observed that
after acquittal or release, the offender is likely to resume the conduct, but
more cautiously. 94 He described the situation in this way:
[T]he criminal process as a solution to child abuse is usually totally
ineffective. Probably it has some deterrent effect on the parent ca-
pable of controlling his conduct, but its chief value lies in satisfying
the conscience of the community that the wrong to a child has been
avenged. That the true causes of the battering parent's conduct
have not been sought out and treated is of little concern.
95
Most cases of child abuse are referred to juvenile or family court and are
tried as dependency cases. 96 The proceedings involve two distinct phases:
first, an adjudication of dependency upon a finding of abuse; second, the
ultimate disposition.9 7 At the initial hearing the court must decide whether
danger of repeated assault requires temporary removal of the child from the
home. The court must weigh the risk of further abuse against the potential
long-range emotional damage to the child and parents caused by temporary
protective care.98
When the case is tried in juvenile or family court,9 9 statutes sometimes
permit limited use of written reports and other types of evidence that might
not be admissible under strict evidentiary rules. The quantum of proof re-
quired to sustain a finding of abuse or neglect is usually a preponderance of
91. Id at 189-90.
92. Id. at 190.
93. Id at 191.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 192.
96. See, e.g., R. BUCHANAN, K. TAYLOR & E. HOFFENBERG, FLORIDA GUARDIAN AD Li-
TEM MANUAL FOR VOLUNTEERS 24 (1980).
97. H. CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 691 (3d ed. 1980). Polier & McDonald, The Family
Court in an Urban Setting in HELPING THE BATTERED CHILD AND HIS FAMILY 208, 212 (C.
Kernpe & R. Heifer eds. 1972).
98. Polier & McDonald, supra note 97, at 212.
99. These are civil proceedings in all states except Delaware. Mele-Sernovitz, Parental Sex-
ual Abuse of Children: The Law as a Therapeutic Toolfor Families in LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF
MALTREATED CHILDREN 78 (D. Gross ed. 1979).
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the evidence, rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt as required in
criminal court. 0 Pretrial conferences encourage full disclosure of facts and
opinions and provide an opportunity to evaluate the evidence and to narrow
issues in dispute which may result in a stipulation or consent decree.' 0 If
not, a trial or adjudication hearing will follow.
10 2
Whether actions in juvenile or family courts are more effective than
criminal actions in rehabilitating the offender, depends to a large extent on
the resources available. In the absence of the needed therapeutic skills and
services, "the goal of replacing punishment with treatment . . . [and] incar-
ceration with rehabilitation" may not be achieved.'0 3 Recent emphasis on
procedural reforms, stressing safeguards for defendants, has been described
as "cheaper than providing substantive services for those who are mentally
ill, engaged in deviant behavior, or are poor. Paradoxically, while adversary
proceedings are becoming the fashion of the day and are resulting in dismis-
sals of more cases, there is a growing demand for harsher sentences."104
The adversary system pits zealous advocates against each other, each
intent on "winning" for his client. This process, however, impedes courts
from "dealing with the complex emotional and psychological problems of
the troubled family. These people not only desperately need the ministra-
tions of the physician and behavioral expert, but the firm insistence of a
court which can insure those services are accepted."' 1 5 Lawyers and judges
must place the ultimate welfare of the child and parents over winning or
losing the client's goal.
106
By using clever courtroom maneuvers the defense attorney can fre-
quently have a neglect petition denied; this he may define as "win-
ning" the case. But in many situations this, in fact, is not
"winning" as far as the child is concerned. The attorney who fails
to give as much consideration to the child's welfare as he gives to
the legal aspects of the case carries a heavy burden if the child is
wrongly returned to battering parents.
0 7
"The law can never serve the true ends of justice until lawyers and
judges alike view the battered child as more than a legal problem."' 0 8 Child
abuse involves behavior that is social and medical in origin 10 9 and the dispo-
sitional stage of the proceedings is "primarily diagnostic and social in na-
100. See, e.g., Isaacs, The Role of the Lawyer in Child Abuse Cases in HELPING THE BATTERED
CHILD AND HIS FAMILY 225, 236 (C. Kempe & R. Heifer eds. 1972). A finding of abuse might
ultimately result in termination of parental rights. It should be noted, therefore, that in 1982
the United States Supreme Court held that "[b]efore a state may sever completely and irrevoca-
bly the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requires that the state support its
allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence." Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-
48 (1982).
101. Delaney, supra note 87, at 202.
102. Id
103. Polier & McDonald, supra note 97, at 213.
104. Id
105. Delaney, supra note 87, at 194.
106. Id
107. Paulsen, supra note 88, at 200.




ture." 110 The court should be seen "as another resource, along with the
social and behavioral scientist, the physician, legal services, the police and
other community agencies concerned with prevention, detection and treat-
ment of child abuse and neglect.""'
Judicial authority should be used to rehabilitate the family whenever
possible, or as a last resort, to terminate parental rights. Simply removing
the victim indefinitely from the home is not an adequate final disposition. "12
Foster care results in placing the child in unfamiliar surroundings with stran-
gers at a time of emotional turmoil. The child may perceive this as punish-
ment for her wrongdoings, 113 adding trauma and pain 11 4 to her already
heavy burden of guilt, confusion and shame. The separation may continue
over a long period of time 15 and in a succession of foster homes'16 to which
the child must adapt." 7 While becoming estranged from parents and sib-
lings," 8a she is in a limbo state, not really belonging to a permanent family
Unit.
1 19
"The court must aid in directing the parent through the social service
maze and often must use its authority to insure that treatment is af-
forded."' 120 Treatment should include individual and group crisis and after-
care therapy for the victim, the offender, and other family members to cor-
rect the dysfunctional family patterns in which the incest occurred. Crisis-
oriented social services may also be available, such as visiting nurses, home-
makers, tutors, and day care. 121 Coordination of criminal and family or ju-
venile court proceedings may be necessary to motivate parents to accept the
help that is available and to protect the child from further abuse.'
2 2
Even after disposition, the court should remain involved and schedule
periodic reviews. At these reviews the social service agency providing treat-
ment should give an accounting of the services which have been provided
and report on the progress of individual family members. 123 The parents
should give an accounting of their progress in correcting the underlying
110. Isaacs, supra note 100, at 231.
111. Delaney, supra note 87, at 197.
112. Polier & McDonald, supra note 97, at 223.
113. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children. Standards for Removal of Children
from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28
STAN. L. REV. 623, 645 (1976).
114. Id at 669.
115. Mnookin,Foster Care-In Whose Best Interest? 43 HARV. EDUC. REV. 599, 610 (1973). See
also Besharov, Child Protection: Past Progress, Present Problems, and Future Directions, 17 FAM. L.Q.
151, 167 (Summer 1983).
116. Wald, supra note 113, at 645-46. "[Cl]hildren in foster care frequently are subjected to
multiple placements, destroying the continuity and stability needed to help a child achieve
stable emotional development. This may, in fact, be the most damaging aspect of foster care."
Id See also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 789 n.15 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
117. Wald, supra note 113, at 667. "[E]ach time a child is separated attachments may be
broken generating insecurity and an inability to form future attachments." Id
118. Polier & McDonald, supra note 97, at 214.
119. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 836 (1977). See also Mnookin,
supra note 115, at 613.
120. Delaney, supra note 87, at 205.
121. Mele-Sernovitz, supra note 99, at 78.
122. Duquette, supra note 80, at 325.
123. Delaney, supra note 87, at 205.
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problems. If the offender is not cooperating or will not or cannot change
after a reasonable period of time has elapsed, termination of parental rights
may be necessary. This will allow permanent placement or adoption of a
child who cannot safely return home 124 and is preferable to allowing the
child "to become a displaced person for [the] years of [her] childhood.'
1 25
REPORT ON JUVENILE COURTS BY BRENDA CHALLENGER, ESQUIRE,
CHIEF STAFF COUNSEL, MARSHALL CITY LEGAL SERVICES,
INC.
Humanitarian impulses and a desire to "save" rather than punish chil-
dren who violate the law, led to the development of juvenile courts resulting
in not altogether satisfactory dispositions. 126 First, juvenile courts often dis-
criminate based on class or culture. 127 Second, juvenile courts deprive chil-
dren of their liberty, 128 while depriving parents of their children in
constitutionally-questionable proceedings.
129
The juvenile court system's genesis is a reaction to harsh prison
sentences and incarceration of youthful offenders with hardened adult
criminals. 13° Theoretically, under the "care and solicitude" of the state' 3 '
"[t]he child was to be 'treated' and 'rehabilitated' and the procedures, from
apprehension through institutionalization, were to be 'clinical' rather than
punitive."' 3 2 The rationale is that the state, acting as parens palriae,' 3 3 is
merely providing for the child's custody in nonadversary civil proceedings
which are not subject to the procedural restrictions required when the state
seeks to deprive a person of his liberty.' 34 The United States Supreme Court
in In re Gault 135 described the motives that led to development of juvenile
courts and questioned the wisdom of allowing the court to have "unbridled
discretion" in the absence of counterbalancing procedural safeguards. 1
36
124. Baker, Big Brother, 53 FLA. B.J. 672, 677 (1979).
125. Id
The advantage of greater short-term support and less long-term custody is not
only the cost saving, but it means that the family who cannot make it and provide for
its own is much sooner identified. When such families are identified by the failure to
improve despite genuine assistance and opportunity to do so, children may be re-
moved sooner from the home and placed in permanent alternative families, such as by
commitment for adoption.
Id
126. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).
127. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745. 763 (1982). See also Guggenheim, A Call to Abol-
ish theJuoenie Justce System, 2 CHILDREN'S RIGHTS REPORT No. 9, 10 (June 1978).
128. See, e.g., Task Force Report: Juvenile Dehquency and Youth Crime (1967) in MODERN JUVE-
NILE JUSTICE 48 (S. Fox. 2d ed. 1981). "In theory the juvenile court was to be helpful and
rehabilitative rather than punitive. . . . In fact it frequently does nothing more nor less than
deprive a child of liberty without due process of law." Id. See also., e.g., Fox, Philosophy and the
Principles ofPu nshment n theJuvenile Court in MODERN JUVENILE JUSTICE 60-61 (S. Fox 2d ed.
1981). See also, e.g., Guggenheim supra note 127, at 8.
129. See, e.g., Davidson, Conronting Child Abuse, 5 FAM. ADVOC. 26, 28-29 (Summer, 1982).
130. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1966).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 15-16.
133. Id at 16.
134. Id at 17.
135. 387 U.S. 1 (1966).
136. Id at 17-18.
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[T]he highest motives and most enlightened impulses led to a pecu-
liar system for juveniles, unknown to our law in any comparable
context. The constitutional and theoretical basis for this peculiar
system is-to say the least-debatable. . . . Juvenile Court his-
tory has again demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however be-
nevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle
and procedure. In 1937, Dean Pound wrote: "The powers of the
Star Chamber were a trifle in comparison with those of our juve-
nile courts .... "1137
Juvenile courts have traditionally had jurisdiction over three types of
proceedings: delinquency, status offenses, and child abuse and neglect. 138
My remarks are directed primarily at abuse and neglect, although many of
my comments and some authority cited apply to delinquency and status of-
fenses as well. Allegations of abuse or neglect may lead to criminal charges
and may result in removal of children from their families through placement
in foster care or termination of parental rights.
1 39
My first objection to juvenile courts is that they are class-based institu-
tions for the poor and minorities.14° "Certainly in the great cities of the
nation the overwhelming number of children processed through the juvenile
court are the children of the poor."' 4 ' Although abuse and neglect occur at
all social and economic levels,' 42 the upper and middle classes are less likely
to be observed t43 and reported. 144 They are also more likely to stay out of
court because they have access to privately arranged corrective treatment
and private care facilities not available to the poor.1 45 The predominantly
middle-class professionals dealing with families charged with abuse or ne-
glect are removed from the poor by education and way of life and are often
biased in their perceptions and judgments of these families. 146 The United
137. Id
138. J. AREEN, FAMILY LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 1194 (1978).
139. See Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child A Reappraisal of the State's Role in Child
Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. LJ. 887, 887-88 (1975). Seealso, e.g., Lassiter v. Department of
Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981).
140. See PaulsenJuvenile Courts, Family Courts, and the Poor Man, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 694, 697
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Paulsen I1.
141. Id. at 696.
142. See H. CLARK supra note 97, at 698. See also J. AREEN, supra 138, at 888-89.
143. See Mnookin, supra note 115, at 619. "[Slince poor families are more subject to scrutiny
by social workers who administer welfare programs, their faults, even if no more common, may
be more conspicuous." Id.
144. See, e.g., Didato, Violence in the Home: How Much Do You Know About It? St. Petersburg
Times, October 17, 1983, at 2D, col. 1.
Child abuse cases involving low-income family members surface more often, but the
rate reflects a reporting bias. Clinics and social agencies rarely deal with affluent fami-
lies concerning this matter. Further, police, doctors and therapists are hesitant to re-
port abuse in affluent families. Many experts believe that like alcoholism, family
abuse is a problem that plagues all social classes and economic levels.
Id.
145. See Paulsen 1I,supra note 140, at 696. See also Smith v. Organization of Foster Families,
431 U.S. 816, 834 (1976). See also Wald, supra note 113, at 674. Many abusive and neglectful
parents are "so burdened with problems that they are unable to adequately protect or care for
their children. Most such parents are very poor, living in very bad housing, and are isolated
from relatives and community support. They generally have few of the skills necessary to cope
in our society." Id.
146. See Paulsen II, supra note 140, at 695.
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States Supreme Court recognized this problem when it observed: "Because
parents subject to termination proceedings are often poor, uneducated, or
members of minority groups, such proceedings are often vulnerable to judg-
ments based on cultural and class bias."
14 7
Handicapped by poverty and lack of education, parents charged with
abuse or neglect are no match for the state with its financial resources; access
to records; and witnesses including caseworkers empowered to investigate
and testify.148 Once the child is in custody, "the State even has the power to
shape the historical events that form the basis for termination."' 149 As a re-
sult, "many 'voluntary' placements are in fact coerced by the threat of ne-
glect proceedings and are not in fact voluntary in the sense of the product of
informed consent."' 150
In the dispositional stage of neglect or abuse proceedings, the "best in-
terest of the child" standard is applied by juvenile courts in deciding
whether a child should be removed from parental custody.' 15  This "allows
the judge to import his personal values into the process, and leaves consider-
able scope for class bias . . . . [C]ases . . . clearly reveal the risks of 'indi-




Moreover, "foster care has been condemned as a class-based intrusion
into the family life of the poor."'1 53 It is also highly questionable whether
these children will be better off in foster care than in their own homes.154 In
Sanlosky v. Kramer the Court said, "Even when a child's natural home is im-
perfect, permanent removal from that home will not necessarily improve his
welfare. . . . ('In fact, under current practice, coercive intervention fre-
quently results in placing a child in a more detrimental situation than he
would be in without intervention')."' 155 Said one commentator:
For nearly two decades, noted authorities have observed that chil-
dren removed from their homes and placed in 'temporary' foster
care often remain there for many years, frequently until their ma-
jority. Such children often suffer serious psychological damage in
foster care and are commonly subjected to numerous moves-each
of which disrupts the child's need for maintenance of continuity
and stability in his relationships with parental figures.156
My second objection to juvenile courts is that they deprive children of
their liberty, 157 and parents of their children, in constitutionally questiona-
147. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 763 (1982).
148. See, e.g. , id.
149. Id
150. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 834 (1976). See qlso Wald,
supra note 113, at 675.
151. See Mnookin, supra note 115, at 619-20.
152. Id
153. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 833 (1976).
154. See e.g., Sussman, Reporttg Child Abuse. A Review of Literature, 8 FAM. L.Q. 245, 312
(1974). "[Experts] have warned that the 'cure' of removing a child from a poor environment
may be worse than the harm to which he is subject." id
155. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 765 n.15 (1982).
156. Report of the Task Force onjuvenileJustte and Delinquency Prevention, in MODERN JUVENILE
JUSTICE 49, 49-50 (S. Fox 2d ed. 1981).
157. See Task Force Report: Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime, supra note 128. See also Gug-
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ble proceedings.158 The right of parents to the custody of their children has
been recognized by the United States Supreme Court. "The fundamental
liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of
their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model
parents. . . . [W]hen the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds,
it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures."' 59 More-
over, parents are in danger of criminal liability stemming from charges of
abuse or neglect.16 0 For that reason, "[m]any of the evidentiary issues that
arise in civil neglect proceedings result from the tendency to equate such
cases with criminal proceedings."' 16 1 Yet, criminal due process safeguards
frequently are not accorded as they have been in delinquency cases since
Gault .16 2 Unfortunately, the Court in Gault did not expressly extend those
protections to abuse and neglect cases.'
6 3
The Director of the ABA's National Legal Resource Center for Child
Advocacy and Protection, has cited these examples of rules of evidence some-
times ignored in the adjudication phase of child abuse trials in juvenile
court:
[Olpinion testimony is permitted without a proper foundation; case
records, reports of clinical evaluations, and other documentary evi-
dence are considered by the judge without copies first being made
available to counsel for the parents and child; the right to confron-
tation and cross-examination of all witnesses is denied; the burden
of proof inappropriately is placed on the parents to persuade the
courf that they are fit to care for their child; and the child's wishes
are not clearly articulated to the judge.
64
The Supreme Court has characterized termination proceedings as "for-
mal and adversarial,"1 6 5 "accusatory and punitive,"' 166 "a unique kind of
deprivation,"' 167 "few losses more grievous,"' 168 and "few forms of state ac-
tion are so severe and so irrevocable."' 169 Yet, juvenile courts have been
reversed and underlying statutes declared unconstitutional for lack of proce-
dural due process.' 7 ° Examples include: failure to provide court-appointed
counsel for indigent parents, 71 the necessity of which the Supreme Court
genheim,supra note 127, at 8. "So long as we maintain the myth that the juvenile justice system
is designed for the children's own welfare, we leave room for the cynical or myopic to deprive
children of their liberty without cause and without meaningful rights." Id.
158. See Davidson, supra note 129, at 28-29.
159. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1982).
160. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981).
161. See J. AREEN, supra note 138, at 1111.
162. Guggenheim, supra note 127, at 4. "Specifically, Gault required that accused juvenile
delinquents be afforded four basic procedural protections: notice of charges; right to counsel;
the right to remain silent; the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses." Id
163. See Davidson, supra note 129, at 41-42.
164. Id at 29.
165. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 42 (1981) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
166. Id at 43 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
167. Id at 27 (Stewart, J., opinion of the Court).
168. Id at 40 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
169. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982).




has held must be determined on a case by case basis; 172 lack of independent
representation of children; neglect of required notice to parents of hearings;
and failure to ensure prompt hearings before emergency removal of children
from their homes.'
73
Juvenile court becomes, in effect, "little more than a kangaroo court for
young people" when blind obedience to the parens patriae philosophy results
in "disregard of constitutional rights . . . .,174 It is also a kangaroo court
for parents when they lose custody of their children in constitutionally ques-
tionable proceedings. 1 75 Because juvenile courts are class-based institutions
discriminating against the poor and minorities, 176 and for the other reasons
previously recited, I join critics who call for the abolition of juvenile
courts. 1 77
MARSHALL STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
MEMORANDUM
TO: Members of the Committee on Professional Ethics
FROM: Lawrence Sage, Chairperson
DATE: February 13, 1984
RE: INQUIRY NO. 84-1: DISCLOSURE OF CONFIDENTIAL
COMMUNICATIONS
Enclosed are three draft opinions prepared independently by three com-
mittee members after discussion and preliminary vote at our January 25th
committee meeting. As you will recall, the preliminary vote was evenly split
three ways with one member, Mr. Fencestradler, abstaining.
The three views reflected by the vote are:
(1) The parents' attorney should not reveal the incest and should
not suggest appointment of counsel for the children, but if
counsel is appointed, the children's counsel should not reveal
the incest without client's consent unless the client is incapa-
ble of making a considered judgment.
(2) The parents' attorney should suggest appointment of counsel
for the children, and both the children's counsel and the par-
ents' attorney should reveal the incest even without their cli-
ents' consent.
(3) The parents' attorney should suggest appointment of counsel
for the children, and may, but is not required, to reveal the
incest. The children's counsel should not disclose the incest
over the objection of a client capable of making a considered
judgment.
172. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981).
173. See Davidson, supra note 129, at 29.
174. In re Ronald S., 69 Cal. App. 3d 866, 869, 138 Cal. Rptr. 387, 389 (1977).
175. See Davidson supra note 129, at 28-29.
176. See Paulsen II, supra note 140 at 697.
177. See e.g., Guggenheim, supra note 127 at 5. "Juvenile court will always be unfair; it will
always be second class. The right course is to abolish it entirely." Id. at 11. See also, e.g., Fox,
Abolihing theJuvenile Court, 28 HARv. L. SCH. BULL. 22 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Fox II]. See
also. e.g., Fox, supra note 128, at 60.
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A member of each group has prepared a proposed ethics opinion em-
bodying the group's answers to the three questions raised by this inquiry.
Because of time constraints, the authors Ms. Truly, Mr. Wright and Mr.
Good, have not seen each other's opinions, therefore, the opinions do not
respond directly to each other. The final opinion will be written after the
committee reaches a consensus and will address opposing arguments on ma-
jor points of contention.
Please send me your written comments after studying the three pro-
posed ethics opinions. All comments received by February 25 will be sent to
you with the agenda for our next meeting. I look forward to receiving your
thoughts on this important inquiry.
MARSHALL STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Ethics Opinion 84-1
Proposal Number I Prepared by Veronica Truly, Esquire
An advisory opinion has been requested as to the obligations of an at-
torney under the following facts:
A lawyer has been appointed by the court to represent indigent
parents in neglect proceedings. The petition alleges that the chil-
dren, aged three, six and nine, are not receiving proper care. They
are dirty and inadequately fed. The lawyer learns from the hus-
band that he has been having sexual intercourse with their nine
year old daughter for the past two years. The wife, who is also a
client, confirms this and tells the lawyer that she is afraid to inter-
fere. The lawyer has interviewed the children and reviewed the
court-ordered child welfare investigation report. He cannot as-
sume from the report or interviews that anyone besides the mother
has discovered the father's sexual abuse of the child.
The court-appointed counsel for the parents asks the following
questions:
(1) Whether he should reveal his clients' confidential communications
that his client, a father charged with child neglect, has been having sexual
intercourse with his nine year old daughter for the past two years; and
(2) Whether he should suggest to the court that counsel be appointed
for the children.
Additionally, the committee will address a related question not raised
by the inquirer, but which is highly pertinent to his inquiry and constitutes a
matter of great public interest:
(3) Whether counsel for the children should reveal confidential com-
munications over the objections of his client, a nine year old girl, that her
father has been having sexual intercourse with her for the past two years.
Summary of Opinion: (1) A lawyer appointed to represent parents in
child neglect proceedings may not reveal the father's confidential communi-
cation which is confirmed by the mother, who is also a client, that the father
has been having sexual intercourse with their nine year old daughter for the
past two years. (2) The lawyer should not suggest to the court that counsel
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be appointed for the children, because it would not be in his clients' best
interests to have counsel appointed for the child who has interests adverse to
his clients. (3) A lawyer appointed to represent children in neglect proceed-
ings should not reveal, over his nine year old client's objection, her confiden-
tial communication that her father has been having sexual intercourse with
her for the past two years, unless her age or mental condition renders her
incapable of making a considered judgment on her own behalf in directing
counsel.
(1) As to the first inquiry, the committee believes that the attorney for
the parents should not reveal the information because disclosure would be-
tray the lawyer's sacred trust to hold inviolate confidences entrusted to him
by his client.' 78  Clients' confidences must be protected from disclosure be-
cause lawyers cannot properly advise or represent their clients without know-
ing all of the facts. 179 Statutes,' 8S0 rules of evidence,"
8 1 and rules of ethics 182
have codified this principle. For example, Canon 4 of the Marshall State
Bar Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to preserve the con-
fidences and secrets of their clients, with narrow exceptions not pertinent
here.18 3 Ethical Consideration 4-1 states:
A lawyer should be fully informed of all the facts of the matter he is
handling in order for his client to obtain the full advantage of our
legal system. . . . The observance of the ethical obligation of a
lawyer to hold inviolate the confidences and secrets of his client not
only facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper rep-
resentation of the client but also encourages laymen to seek early
legal assistance. 184
Clients' confidences are likewise protected under Rule 1.6 of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct recently adopted by the American Bar
Association. 185
178. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
ABA CODE]. ABA CODE is the source for all cites to the Marshall Code of Professional Respon-
sibility in text. The Florida state statutes are the basis for all Marshall statutory citations, unless
otherwise noted. See infra note 228.
179. Id.
180. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West 1974) provides that it is the duty of a lawyer
"to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself to preserve the secrets of his
client."
181. FLA. STAT. § 90.502 (1983) (dealing with lawyer-client privilege).
182. ABA CODE, supra note 178, at EC 4-1 and DR 4-101.
183. ABA CODE, supra note 178, at Canon 4 and DR 4-101. DR 4-101 requires that a
lawyer not knowingly reveal a confidence or secret of his client except
(C) A lawyer may reveal:
(1) Confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients affected, but
only after a full disclosure to them.
(2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or re-
quired by law or court order.
(3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary
to prevent the crime.
(4) Confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or to defend
himself or his employees or associates against an accusation of wrongful
conduct.
Id. at DR 4-101.
184. Id at EC 4-1.
185. MODEL RULES OF PROFESStONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
MODEL RULES]. Text should be read as if a special committee of the Marshall State Bar Asso-
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In addition, Canons 6 and 7 of the Marshall Code require a lawyer to
represent his client competently 8 6 and zealously.'8 7 Voluntary disclosure of
information detrimental to a client without his consent is inconsistent with
zealous representation. DR 7-101(A)(3) prohibits a lawyer from prejudicing
or damaging his client during the course of the professional relationship.'
Canon 5 requires a lawyer to exercise independent professional judgment on
behalf of a client.' 8 9 EC 5-1 states: "The professional judgment of a lawyer
should be exercised, within the bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his
client and free of compromising influences and loyalties. Neither his per-
sonal interests . . . nor the desires of third persons should be permitted to
dilute his loyalty to his client."' 190
The Comment to Model Rule 1.2 is even more specific in providing that
the lawyer "should defer to the client regarding . . . concern for third per-
sons who might be adversely affected."'' ABA Informal Opinion 869
(1965),192 applying provisions similar to the earlier Canons of Professional
Ethics,' 93 advised that the wife's lawyer in divorce and custody proceedings
is ethically bound not to reveal information confided to him by the client
that she has become pregnant by a man other than her husband.
94
The Preamble to the Model Rules stresses the importance of maintain-
ing clients' confidences: "[T]he client has a reasonable expectation that in-
formation relating to the client will not be voluntarily disclosed and that
disclosure of such information may be judicially compelled only in accord-
ance with recognized exceptions to the attorney-client and work product
privileges."1
95
The committee members recognize that paternal incest is a terrible
thing for a child to endure; they also recognize that maintenance of the ad-
versary system by upholding the sanctity of confidentiality is of supreme im-
portance. The inquiring attorney has been appointed to represent a father
charged with child neglect. To reveal his confidential admission of incest
might lead to criminal charges and infringe constitutionally protected rights
against self-incrimination. Confidentiality must be placed above prevention
of the risk of injury to individuals in particular instances. Confidentiality
takes precedence, even if occasionally some people are harmed.
The inquiring lawyer in our fact situation does not know, nor should he
be deemed to know, that the parent's abusive conduct will continue. Re-
quiring disclosure under these circumstances undermines the adversary sys-
ciation is studying the Model Rules to determine whether to recommend their adoption, with or
without changes, by the Marshall Supreme Court, to replace the Marshall Code of Professional
Responsibility [hereinafter cited as Marshall CPR].
186. ABA CODE, supra note 178, at Canon 6.
187. Id at Canon 7.
188. Id at DR 7-101(A)(3).
189. Id at Canon 5.
190. Id at EC 5-1.
191. MODEL RULES, supra note 185, at Rule 1.2 Comment.
192. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 869 (1965).
193. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908).
194. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 869 (1965).
195. MODEL RULES, supra note 185, at Scope.
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tern. If clients cannot be assured that what they tell their lawyers will be
held in confidence, they may withhold damaging information and lawyers
will be prevented from counseling their clients to refrain from contemplated
wrongful acts. The deterrent effect of lawyers' advice to clients undoubtedly
forestalls many actions that would be harmful to individuals or society. In
the case under consideration, the attorney may be able to deter further acts
of child abuse by counseling his client. He should stress the harm and dan-
ger of the conduct and the harsh consequences that may result if he persists.
The attorney may encourage his client to seek therapy or psychological
counseling. 196
(2) As to the second inquiry, the committee believes that the parents'
attorney should not suggest to the court that counsel be appointed for the
children because it would not be in his clients' best interests to have counsel
appointed for a child whose interests are adverse to his clients. In an inquiry
to the Committee on Professional Ethics of the State Bar of California,
1 9 7
the inquirer asked: "When a lawyer representing a client in child custody
proceedings discovers conflicting interests of his client and the child, may he
ethically notify the court of the conflict and suggest court appointment of a
separate lawyer for the child?"' 98 The committee answered in the negative
and stated that the committee assumed the information discovered by the
lawyer suggested that it would not be in the child's best interests that his
client have custody "or that other interests of the child, in good conscience,
require independent representation."' 99 Suggesting appointment of counsel
may also be an impermissible breach of confidence. The committee rea-
soned that information indicating conflicting interests would come within
the broad definition of confidences and secrets, which cannot be disclosed
under Canon 4; such disclosure would also be contrary to the Canon 7 re-
quirement of zealous representation.
200
The California opinion reasoned further that the attorney for a parent
in child custody proceedings does not concurrently represent the child. The
child need not be represented because "[p]resumably he or she is protected
by the requirement of substantive law providing that custody is to be
awarded 'according to the best interest of the child.' ",201 Our committee
agrees with that reasoning and in answer to the inquiry advises that the
attorney for the parents cannot ethically suggest representation for the child
to the court.
(3) Regarding whether counsel for the children should reveal the in-
cest over the objection of his nine year old client, the committee believes
that, if the client is competent to make such a decision, counsel has an obli-
gation to maintain the confidences and secrets in accordance with the child's
wishes and should not disclose such confidences. If counsel determines, how-
ever, that the child is not competent to make this decision for any reason
196. ABA CODE, supra note 178, at EC 7-8.







including immature judgment, the Marshall CPR suggests that counsel de-
cide for her as set forth in EC 7-12:
Any mental or physical condition of a client that renders him inca-
pable of making a considered judgment on his own behalf casts
additional responsibilities upon his lawyer. . . . If a client under
disability has no legal representative, his lawyer may be compelled
in court proceedings to make decisions on behalf of the client ...
If the disability of a client and the lack of a legal representative
compel the lawyer to make decisions for his client, the lawyer
should consider all circumstances then prevailing and act with care
to safeguard and advance the interests of his client.
20 2
Model Rule 1.14 is more explicit and permits counsel to seek appoint-
ment of a guardian, but "only when the lawyer reasonably believes that the
client cannot adequately act in the client's own interest. '20 3 The rule states
that the lawyer of a client with impaired ability to make adequately consid-
ered decisions "shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-
lawyer relationship with the client." °2 0 4 The Comment to the rule notes that
"[in many circumstances, however, appointment of a legal representative
may be expensive or traumatic for the client."'20 5 Since neither the Marshall
CPR nor the Model Rules specify guidelines for determining competency,
standards applied by courts in determining competency for children to tes-
tify may be relevant. For a child to be competent to testify as a witness most
courts require that the child (1) have "sufficient intelligence to receive just
impressions of facts,"' 206 (2) be capable of relating them clearly, (3) have
ability to distinguish between truth and falsehood, and (4) understand that
an oath requires one to tell the truth.
2 07
Competency to make key representational decisions, however, involves
some different considerations. The Comment to Model Rule 1.14, for exam-
ple, recognizes that "[wihen the client is a minor . . . maintaining the ordi-
nary client-lawyer relationship may not be possible in all respects ...
Nevertheless, a client lacking legal competency often has the ability to un-
derstand, deliberate upon, and reach conclusions about matters affecting the
client's own well-being."'20 8 The Comment continues, "[flor example, chil-
202. ABA CODE, supra note 178, at EC 7-12.
203. MODEL RULES, supra note 185, at Rule 1.14(b).
204. Id. at Rule 1.14(a).
205. Id. at Rule 1.14 Comment.
206. Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523, 525 (1895).
207. Id. The Supreme Court held that a five and one-half year old child was competent to
testify in a murder trial, stating:
[T]here is no precise age which determines the question of competency. This depends
on the capacity and intelligence of the child, his appreciation of the difference between
truth and falsehood, as well as of his duty to tell the former. The decision of this
question rests primarily with the trial judge who sees the proposed witness . . . and
may resort to any examination which will tend to disclose his capacity and intelligence
as well as his understanding of the obligations of an oath. . . . [Tihe decision of the
trial judge will not be disturbed on review unless from that which is preserved it is
clear that it was erroneous.
Id Most state courts follow the policy established by Wheeler and hold that age alone is not
grounds for refusing to permit a witness to testify. Stafford, The Chld as a Witness, 37 WASH. L.
REV. 303, 304 (1962).
208. MODEL RULES, supra note 185, at Rule 1.14 Comment.
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dren as young as five or six years of age, and certainly those of ten or twelve,
are regarded as having opinions that are entitled to weight in legal proceed-
ings concerning their custody."
'20 9
With these provisions in mind, the committee believes that counsel for
the children should not reveal the incest over the objection of his client if
counsel has determined that the child is competent to make that decision. If
the child is not competent, counsel should either act as de facto guardian
and make the decision in the child's best interest or see that a guardian ad
hitem is appointed for her.
MARSHALL STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Ethics Opinion 84-1
Proposal Number II Prepared by Wellington Wright, Esquire
An advisory opinion has been requested as to the obligations of an at-
torney under the following facts:
[same facts as stated in Proposal Number I]210
The court-appointed counsel for the parents asks the following
questions:
[same questions as in Proposal Number I]
21t
Summary of Opinion: (1) A lawyer representing parents in child ne-
glect proceedings should reveal the father's confidential communication,
confirmed by the mother who is also a client, that the father has been having
sexual intercourse with their nine year old daughter for the past two years.
(2) If the court does not appoint counsel for the children, the parents' lawyer
should suggest to the court that counsel be appointed. (3) A lawyer ap-
pointed to represent children in neglect proceedings should reveal, even
without consent, the confidential communication of the nine year old client
that her father has been having sexual intercourse with her for the past two
years.
(1) As to the first inquiry, the committee believes that the attorney
should reveal the information. Because of the helplessness of children at the
hands of abusive parents, the overriding concern for welfare and protection
of children must take precedence over the client's right to confidentiality.
The child may be in great jeopardy and the parents' lawyer may be the only
one who knows of such danger. The child is undoubtedly too intimidated,
ignorant, or embarrassed to tell anyone. She apparently has told no one in
two years. The child placement process has been invoked by filing the ne-
glect petition, and the client's disclosure is highly relevant to the issues
raised. Absent the lawyer's disclosure, however, the information will almost
certainly remain secret. Some intervention is necessary to assess the situation
and devise protection, counseling and treatment.
209. Id




It is for the courts to decide the best interest of the children and, in
order to make a wise decision, courts should have all of the information
available. The attorney has knowledge of activities which indicate his cli-
ent's propensity for sexually abusing his young daughter, and that it may be
a crime of a continuing nature. 21 2 Although Canon 4 requires lawyers to
maintain clients' confidences, an exception is made when the information
relates to a client's intention to commit a crime.2 13 DR 4-101(C)(3) of the
Marshall CPR permits a lawyer to reveal "[t]he intention of his client to
commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime."'2 14 In
some jurisdictions (Florida, for example), the language of the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility is mandatory and requires the lawyer to reveal the inten-
tion of a client to commit a crime.
2 15
Model Rule 1.6 prohibits lawyers from revealing information relating to
the representation of a client unless the client consents, with the exception
that "[a] lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer rea-
sonably believes necessary: (1) to prevent the client from committing a crim-
inal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or
substantial bodily harm .... ,"216 It is reasonable to believe that, without
some type of intervention, the crime of incest will continue 217 and will have
grave consequences for the child's physical, emotional, and mental health.
2 18
Such conduct is universally condemned 21 9 and studies show that parental
incest is a traumatic experience for a child and is likely to cause severe and
long-lasting harm.
220
Moreover, all states have child abuse reporting laws,22' many of which
require all citizens, as well as certain named health and child care profes-
sionals, to report known or suspected child abuse. 222 Many states also grant
tort immunity to those reporting such crimes and abrogate the privileged
status of communications between the professional and client or patient.
2 23
Some statutes place a statutory obligation on lawyers to reveal child abuse.
212. See, e.g., McCoid, The Battered Child and Other Assaults Upon the Family: Part One, 50
MINN. L. REV. 1, 31 (1965) (communication of abuse by an adult to his attorney may lead to an
inference of further abuse and further criminal conduct).
213. ABA CODE, supra note 178, at DR 4-101(C)(3).
214. Id.
215. FLA. B. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR4-101(D) (2) (1983).
216. MODEL RULES, supra note 185, at Rule 1.6(b)(1).
217. See, supra note 212 and indfa note 263 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 44-68 and accompanying text.
219. See IJA/ABA STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, ABUSE & NEGLECT 2. ID commen-
tary at 70 (Tentative Draft 1981).
220. See supra notes 44-68 and accompanying text.
221. W. WADLINGTON, C. WHITEBREAD & S. DAVIS, CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 789
(1983).
All 50 states now have child abuse reporting laws. . . . Today's typical statute defines
the class of persons who must report to include at least health care professionals, teach-
ers and social workers. Most statutes provide for civil immunity for one who reports in
good faith, and there is generally a waiver of both the husband-wife and physician-
patient privileges.
id.
222. Besharov, The Legal Aspects of Reporting Known and Suspected Child. Abuse and Neglect, 23
VILL. L. REV. 458, 465 (1977-78) [hereinafter cited as Besharov II.]
223. Paulsen, supra note 88, at 196, 198-99.
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In Ohio224 and Nevada,2 25 for example, attorneys are expressly required to
report known or suspected child abuse. Some report statutes, Florida's for
example, expressly exclude lawyers from reporting.226 Wisconsin's report
statute was amended during the 1984 legislative session to give lawyers dis-
cretionary authority to report known or suspected child abuse. 227 Marshall's
reporting statute does not expressly exclude or include lawyers among the
named individuals required to report. The statute does, however, require
reporting by "[a]ny person, including, but not limited to [those named]
.... ,228 The term "any person" can be construed as broad enough to
encompass lawyers.
The New Jersey State Bar Committee on Professional Ethics rendered
an advisory opinion on a similar question. The committee's inquiry con-
cerned an attorney representing a mother whose custody of her children was
challenged by a state agency. The attorney learned that in the past his client
had physically abused her children and "engaged in other conduct toward
the children that raises questions as to her fitness as a mother. '229 The com-
mittee's opinion focused on the continuing nature of child abuse and "the
state's concern in child welfare raising policy considerations different from
those involved in the usual criminal or civil case. A child abuse case is a
matter calling for the proper protection and custody of the child. Punish-
ment of the offender may be a separate issue for a separate proceeding.
'230
The opinion advised that the confidentiality privilege does not apply be-
cause "pursuit of the client's objective to maintain parental control will
probably constitute fraud on the court in misrepresenting the parent's con-
224. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (Page Supp. 1983).
225. NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.502(2)(d) (1979).
226. FLA. STAT. § 415.109 (1983). Florida's report statute abrogates privileged communica-
tions as grounds for failure to report "except that between attorney and cintt. ... Id (emphasis
added).
227. Wisconsin Act 172 (Assembly Bill 296, March 22, 1984).
228. The Florida Statutes are the basis for the Marshall Statutes cited in the text. The
Florida Statutes cited herein are standard reporting statutes comparable to reporting statutes in
other jurisdictions. These statutes were chosen by the author in allegiance to her home jurisdic-
tion, although the principles set forth are applicable in many other jurisdictions. The major
distinction between the Marshall Statutes and the Florida Statutes is that Florida Statute
§ 415.109, cited above, supra note 226, distinctly forbids the attorney from revealing privileged
attorney-client communications. The Marshall Statutes do not contain a provision similar to
Florida Statute § 415.109. FLA. STAT. § 415.504 (1983).
(1) Any person, including, but not limited to, any:
(a) Physician, osteopath, medical examiner chiropractor, nurse, or hospital personnel
engaged in the admission, examination, care, or treatment of persons;
(b) Health or mental health professional other than one listed in paragraph (a);
(c) Practitioner who relies solely on spiritual means for healing;
(d) School teacher or other school official or personnel;
(e) Social worker, day care center worker, or other professional child care, foster care,
residential, institutional worker; or
(f) Law enforcement officer, who knows, or has reasonable cause to suspect, that a
child is an abused or neglected child shall report such knowledge or suspicion to the
Department of Protective Services.
Id But see infra text accompanying note 277.





tinuing fitness .... 1,211
Applying the reasoning of the New Jersey opinion to the matter under
consideration, the committee recognizes that DR 7-102(B) of the ABA
Code 232 and the Marshall CPR 233 has been amended to exempt privileged
communications from the requirement that the attorney reveal a client's
fraud if he refuses to rectify it.2 34 Nevertheless, if not on the basis of fraud,
then on the basis of continuing crime, the lawyer should disclose the infor-
mation. Averting the possibility of grave harm to children should take pre-
cedence over the obligation to preserve clients' confidences.
(2) As to the second inquiry, the committee believes that if the court
does not appoint counsel for the children, the attorney should suggest that
counsel be appointed. The parents' lawyer does not represent the chil-
dren.235 They are not parties to the proceedings, 2 36 but will be greatly af-
fected by the outcome and should have their own counsel appointed to
represent their interests.2 37 Courts have inherent, 238 and in some states, stat-
utory239 authority to do so. Child abuse or neglect statutes require or permit
the court to appoint a representative for the child,2 40 although the exact
stage in the proceedings24 I and the representative's functions are seldom
specified. 242 Courts in the State of Marshall are not required by statute or
court rule to appoint counsel for children in abuse or neglect proceedings,
which in Marshall and many other states, are usually tried as dependency
231. Id
232. ABA CODE, supra note 178, at DR 7-102(B).
233. Id
234. Id
235. To do so would be a conflict of interest. Fraser, Independent Representationfor the Abused
and Neglected Child The Guardian Ad Litem, 13 CAL. W.L. REv. 16, 31 (1976-77). See also
Redeker, The Right of an Abused Child to Independent Counsel and the Role of the Child Advocate in Child
Abuse Cases, 23 VILL. L. REv. 521, 527-530 (1977-78).
236. See Comment, Lawyeringfor the Abused Child "You Can't Go Home Again," 29 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 1216, 1225 (1982).
237. See Bross, Legal Advocacy for the Maltreated Child, 14 TRIAL 29, 30 (July 1978).
238. See, e.g., Zinni v. Zinni, 103 R.I. 417, 421, 238 A.2d 373, 376 (1968). "It is well settled
that whenever in any judicial proceeding it shall be made to appear that there are interests of a
minor to be protected, the judicial officer presiding has the inherent power to appoint a guard-
ian ad litem for the protection of the minor's interests." Id See also Speca, Representation for
Children in Custody Disputes. Its Time Has Come, 48 UMKC L. REV. 328, 330 (1980).
239. In Florida and some other states, courts are required both by statute and court rules to
appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the child in all abuse or neglect judicial proceedings.
FLA. STAT. § 415.508 (1983) and FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.300. See also, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40
§ 506 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979). See also Comment, Lawyeringfor the Abused Child- "You Can't go
Home Again," supra note 236, at 1222-23.
240. Comment, Lawyering for the Abused Child" "You Can't go Home Again," supra note 236, at
1222-23. "[Florty-one states have adopted statutes mandating the appointment of an independ-
ent legal representative for abused and neglected children." Id
241. Fraser, supra note 235, at 30.
242. Comment, Lawyeringfor the Abused Child "You Can't go Home Again," supra note 236, at
1229-30. Some statutes that do specify duties appear to give contradictory directions, for exam-
ple, those that require that a guardian ad litem be appointed require that the guardian be an
attorney charged with representing both the child's wishes and the best interests of the child.
See, Chambers, The Ambiguous Role of the Lawyer Representing the Minor in Domestic Relations Litiga-
tion, 70 ILL. BJ. 510, 511 (1982). Those statutes appear to leave the child without a spokesper-
son who will advocate her wishes. See Redeker, supra note 235, at 540. The guardian may not






In the situation under consideration the children should be repre-
sented,244 and if the court does not appoint counsel for them, the parents'
lawyer should suggest that the court do so, because no one else in the pro-
ceeding represents them. Although a petition alleging child abuse or neglect
is filed on behalf of a child by the welfare department, 245 the state attorney
who represents the petitioner is a prosecutor whose goal is to prove the abuse
or neglect alleged in the petition.2 46 The welfare department's responsibility
is toward the entire family which may conflict with the children's best
interest.
24 7
(3) As to the related question of whether counsel for the children
should reveal the incest over the objections of his nine year old client, the
committee believes that given the seriousness of the abuse,24 3 the distinct
possibility that it will continue,24 9 and the questionable competency of the
child, counsel should reveal the information. A nine year old child's compe-
tency to direct counsel in the child's best interest is problematic, both be-
cause of her tender years and the possibility that she has been subjected to
manipulative pressures and intimidation capable of clouding the judgment
of an even more mature victim of parental incest.
250
Disclosure should be made whether the representative is an attorney or
a guardian ad hlem. A nonlawyer guardian ad tem is not subject to lawyers'
codes of ethics imposing confidentiality constraints. 25 ' Statutes or court
rules governing appointment of guardians ad htem may, however, impose an
obligation on the guardian adlitem to maintain the child's confidential com-
munications. Although the distinction in the role of the attorney and the
243. See, e.g., R. BUCHANAN, K. TAYLOR & E. HOFFMAN, supra note 96, at 24.
244. See, e.g., Note, Due Process for Children.- A Right to Counsel in Custody Proceedings, 4 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 177, 185 (1974). See also, e.g., Sussman, supra note 154, at 304, noting
the views of two commentators:
Carson supports counsel for children since conflicts often appear between their rights
and interest and those of the state or the parents. Burt points to the necessity for
counsel since children often want to remain with their parents even though they have
been maltreated and state intervention may be benign.
Id
245. See, e.g., R. BUCHANAN, K. TAYLOR & E. HOFFENBERG, supra note 96, at 9.
246. Id. See also Isaacs, supra note 100, at 228-29.
247. See, R. BUCHANAN, K. TAYLOR & E. HOFFENBERG, supra note 96, at 9. See also
Redeker, supra note 235, at 540.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 44-68.
249. See supra note 212 and mnfra note 263 and accompanying text.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 24-32.
251. A guardian adlitem's role is to protect the child's best interest during particular litiga-
tion. H. CLARK,supra note 97, at 723. Although generally a guardian adihtem is not required to
be an attorney, see, e.g., FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.300, frequently courts appoint attorneys to serve in
that capacity. Presumably, if serving only as guardian ad litem for the child, an attorney is not
bound by the confidentiality requirements of Canon 4. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 40 § 506
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983) (Supp. to Historical & Practice Notes).
[U]nder section 506, the guardian adlitem is also the attorney who has been appointed
to represent the child. Thus, perhaps one of the difficulties inherent in the guardian ad
item procedure may have been obviated, namely the lack of a privilege of confidenti-
ality as to communications between the guardian ad htem and the child.
Id. See also Chambers, supra note 242, at 511.




guardian ad hitem is not always clear, the guardian ad hem at least is required
to consider the child's wishes along with all of the other circumstances and
factors in determining what course of action would promote the child's best
interest.252 The attorney may have a more limited role of advocating the
child's wishes to the court, even if he does not agree with them.
253
If the attorney doubts the child's competency because of her tender
years, he may feel compelled to request that the court appoint a guardian ad
hi'em.
2 54 The lawyer could then advocate the child's wishes and the guard-
ian adlitem could advocate what he or she determines to be in the child's best
interest. The court may, however, perceive this as a wasteful duplication of
effort causing added expense and delay. EC 7-12 of the Marshall Code
2 55
and Rule 1.14 of the Model Rules 256 deal with clients under a disability.
Model Rule 1.14(b) says that a lawyer for a client under a disability is per-
mitted to seek appointment of a guardian, but "only when the lawyer rea-
sonably believes that the client cannot adequately act in the client's own
interest."2 57 Neither this rule nor EC 7-12 is very helpful, however, because
they give so little guidance to a lawyer attempting to ascertain whether or
not a child is competent to direct counsel and to make considered judgments
on the child's own behalf.
MARSHALL STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Ethics Opinion 84-1
Proposal Number III Prepared by Wallace Good, Esquire
An advisory opinion has been requested as to the obligations of an at-
torney under the following facts:
[same facts as stated in Proposal Number I]258
The court-appointed counsel for the parents asks the following
questions:
[same questions as in Proposal Number 1]259
Summary of Opinion: (1) A lawyer representing parents in child ne-
glect proceedings may, but is not required to, disclose information revealed
in the father's confidential communication, confirmed by the mother who is
also a client, that the father has been having sexual intercourse with their
nine year old daughter for the past two years. (2) If the court does not ap-
point counsel for the children, the parents' lawyer should suggest to the court
that counsel be appointed. (3) A lawyer appointed to represent children in
neglect proceedings should not reveal confidential communications, over the
252. See Bross & Munson, Alternative Models of Legal Representation for Children, 5 OKLA. CITY
U.L. REV. 561, 578-79 (1980).
253. See, e.g., Counsel for Children: Guidelines for Courts and Counsel in Civil Custody Cases, 56
CONN. B.J. 484, 488 (1982).
254. Id at 488.
255. ABA CODE, supra note 178, at EC 7-12.
256. MODEL RULES, supra note 185, at Rule 1.14.
257. Id at Rule 1.14(b).




objections of his nine year old client, that her father has been having sexual
intercourse with her for the past two years, unless the child's age or mental
condition renders her incapable of making a considered judgment on her
own behalf.
(1) As to the first inquiry, the committee believes that the attorney
may reveal the information, but is not required to do so. Two important
interests are in conflict: society's interest in protecting children versus the
sanctity of the attorney-client relationship. The helplessness of children too
young, frightened, and confused to escape the abuse and neglect or to com-
municate effectively, can create severe tensions and conflicts for the lawyer.
On one hand, his duty under Canon 7 of the Marshall CPR is to represent
his client zealously 26° and under Canon 4 his duty is to preserve the client's
confidences and secrets. 26 1 On the other hand, EC 7-10 says, it is the duty of
the lawyer "to treat with consideration all persons involved in the legal pro-
cess and to avoid infliction of needless harm.
262
If the lawyer reasonably believes that this two-year pattern of recurring
sexual abuse will continue, in spite of his client's protestations to the con-
trary, the lawyer may regard it as being in the nature of a continuing
crime 263 that may be revealed under DR 4-101 (C)(3) of the Marshall CPR
as an exception to the requirement of confidentiality of client's communica-
tions.264 This is consistent with modern medical and social science data
recognizing a "battered child syndrome" as a recurring pattern of child
abuse. 265 Likewise, under Model Rule 1.6, a lawyer who reasonably believes
disclosure is necessary to prevent a client from committing a criminal act
which the lawyer believes is likely to result in "substantial bodily harm" may
make such disclosure. 266 Codes of professional responsibility in some other
states are even stronger, requiring rather than permitting lawyers to reveal
clients' intentions to commit crimes.
267
The Terminology section of the Model Rules defines "reasonably be-
lieves" (a term used in Rule 1.6) as denoting "that the lawyer believes the
matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is
reasonable. ' ' 2 6 8 Incest with a young child is a crime,269 and it is reasonable
to believe that it will continue, 2 70 but whether it will result in "substantial
bodily harm' 27 1 may be less clear. Emotional or psychological harm may be
260. ABA CODE, supra note 178, at Canon 7.
261. Id. at Canon 4.
262. Id. at EC 7-10.
263. See supra notes 212 and 217 and accompanying text.
264. ABA CODE, supra note i78, at DR 4-101(C)(3).
265. See Landeros v. Flood, 17 Cal. 3d 399, 551 P.2d 389, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976). In
Landeros the California Supreme Court reversed dismissal of a suit by a battered child against a
hospital and physician for failure to diagnose and report "battered child syndrome" resulting in
further injury to child after being returned home to allegedly battering parents. Id
266. MODEL RULES, supra note 185, at Rule 1.6(b)(1).
267. See, e.g., FLA. B. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(D)(2) (1983).
268. MODEL RULES, supra note 185, at Terminology.
269. Mele-Sernovitz, supra note 99, at 87 n.32. Incest is a statutory offense in all states but
Indiana, whose incest statute has been repealed. Id
270. See supra notes 212 and 263 and accompanying text.
271. MODEL RULES, supra note 185, at Rule 1.6(b)(1).
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considered "mental" rather than "bodily" harm. Even if the lawyer reason-
ably believes the sexual abuse will continue and that it will result in substan-
tial bodily harm, he still has discretion under the Marshall CPR 272 and the
Model Rules2 73 as to whether or not to reveal the information. If in exercis-
ing his discretion he decides not to reveal, the child will be left unprotected
from exploitation and harm by parents entrusted with her care.
Also of concern to the lawyer is his knowledge that his disclosure may
lead to invocation of the criminal process, foster or institutional care for the
child or children, and termination of parental rights. These are all drastic
measures which some authorities believe may be even more harmful to a
child than the incestuous relationship itself.27 4 Nevertheless, in some juris-
dictions other than Marshall, disclosure is mandatory and failure to reveal
could subject the lawyer to discipline.2 75 Moreover, statutes in some juris-
dictions, including Marshall, provide criminal sanctions for failure to report
known or suspected child abuse. 2 76 Lawyers, however, are not included
among the named individuals required to report child abuse in Marshall.
2 77
Thus, whether or not the lawyer should reveal his client's incest de-
pends, first, on the substantive law and second, on his own judgment and
assessment of the situation. Since he has discretion in the matter under the
Marshall CPR, 2 78 he will have to decide whether protection of the client's
confidences should take precedence over the safety and welfare of children.
(2) As to the second inquiry, the committee believes that the parents'
attorney should suggest to the court that counsel be appointed for the chil-
dren if the court does not do so on its own initiative. This suggestion could
be made without disclosing any confidential information to the court by sim-
ply suggesting appointment of counsel without specifying a reason, and
would be a small intrusion on the attorney-client relationship compared to
the crucial interest at stake.
Even if counsel for the children is appointed, the parents' lawyer cannot
assume that counsel will learn of the incest, and this leads to another ques-
tion: May the parents' lawyer disclose the information to the children's
counsel? Although the question was not raised by inquiring attorney, the
committee addresses it as an important related question, governed by our
answer to the inquiring attorney's first question. Unfortunately, neither the
Marshall CPR2 79 nor the Model Rules280 specifies to whom disclosure of
272. ABA CODE, supra note 178, at DR 4-101(C)(3).
273. MODEL RULES, supra note 185, at Rule 1.6(b)(1).
274. See, e.g., Giarretto, supra note 23, at 148. "It is evident that typical community inter-
vention in most cases, rather than being constructive, has the effect of a knockout blow to a
family already weakened by serious internal stresses." Id. See also IJA/ABA STANDARDS FOR
JUVENILE JUSTICE, ABUSE & NEGLECT 8.3 commentary at 70-71 (Tentative Draft 1981); J.
GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 32, at 64.
275. See, e.g., FLA. B. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(D)(2) (1983).
276. Besharov reported that of the 39 states imposing penalties for failure to report child
abuse or neglect, 30 provide a criminal penalty only, one a civil penalty only, and four states
and one territory provide both civil and criminal penalties. Besharov II, supra note 222, at 480.
277. FLA. STAT. § 415.504 (1983). But see supra text accompanying note 228.
278. ABA CODE, supra note 178, at DR 4-101(C)(3).
279. ABA CODE, supra note 178.
280. MODEL RULES, supra note 185.
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clients' confidences should be made when required or permitted by the rules.
It is the committee's opinion, however, that if the parents' lawyer determines
that he may or must disclose his clients' confidences, he should make disclo-
sure to the tribunal or other authority, but not to counsel for the children,
because the parents' attorney and children's counsel represent conflicting
interests.
(3) As to the related question of whether counsel for the children
should reveal the incest over the objection of his nine year old client, the
committee believes that if he learns of it from the child herself, the informa-
tion is a confidence. 2 11 If he learns of it from some other source during his
representation, it is a secret. 282 Either way, the information is confidential
and he should not reveal it, 28 3 assuming that the nine year old child is com-
petent to make such a decision. In assessing her competence, counsel may
want assistance from other professionals. The Comment to Model Rule 1.14
states that in dealing with a client under a disability, a "lawyer should con-
sult an appropriate diagnostician for guidance. ' 28 4 This guidance may be
helpful in assessing the child's competence.
ABA Informal Opinion 1160 (1971) gives similar advice regarding du-
ties and obligations ofjuvenile court lawyers.2 85 One question was whether
a lawyer who believes his juvenile client needs help, "should 'urge the child
to accept the professional help that is available through the court.' ",286 The
opinion cautioned that a lawyer should not try to substitute his judgment for
the special knowledge and experience of a professional social worker, penolo-
gist, or psychiatrist, and stressed the need for professionals to work
together.
287
If counsel for the children determines that the daughter is not compe-
tent to direct him not to make disclosure, he can either seek appointment of
a guardian ad htem ,288 or take responsibility and decide for himself whether
or not to make disclosure.28 9 If a guardian ad lem is appointed, counsel
should disclose the information to the guardian and abide by his or her deci-
sion as to further disclosure. If counsel takes responsibility himself for the
281. ABA CODE, supra note 178, at DR 4-101(A).
282. Id
283. Id at DR 4-101(B)(1).
284. MODEL RULES, supra note 185, at Rule 1.14 Comment.
285. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1160 (1971).
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. MODEL RULES, supra note 185, at Rule 1.14(b). "A lawyer may seek the appointment
of a guardian or take other protective action with respect to a client, only when the lawyer
reasonably believes that the client cannot adequately act in the client's own interest." Id. The
Comment to Rule 1.14 states,
When the client is a minor . . . maintaining the ordinary client-lawyer relationship
may not be possible in all respects. . . . Nevertheless, a client lacking legal compe-
tence often has the ability to understand, deliberate upon, and reach conclusions
about matters affecting the client's own well-being. Furthermore, to an increasing
extent the law recognizes intermediate degrees of competence. For example, children
as young as five or six years of age, and certainly those of ten or twelve, are regarded as
having opinions that are entitled to weight in legal proceedings concerning their
custody.
Id. at Rule 1.14 Comment.
289. ABA CODE, supra note 178, at EC 7-12.
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decision, he will be governed by the same considerations discussed in answer
to the first inquiry of this opinion.
If counsel decides not to disclose, he still must decide whether his proper
role is advocate for the child's wishes, advocate for what he believes is the
child's best interest, or neutral investigator and presenter of evidence includ-
ing the child's wishes, without advocating that or any other particular posi-
tion.290 The neutral role is the approach adopted by the New York Legal
Aid Society, when clients in neglect and dependency cases are too young to
understand the nature of the action.29 ' The Massachusetts Bar Association
Committee on Professional Ethics advised a different approach for a lawyer
appointed to represent a "child in need of services." '292 The lawyer "should
handle the case in the manner he or she considers to be in the best interest of
the child, even if contrary to the wishes of the child or the child's par-
ents." 29 3 Although counsel's role is enunciated by statutes in some states,
294
the matter is unsettled in Marshall. The committee believes, however, that
with counsel's advice and guidance, a mutually agreeable position can usu-






Chairperson, Marshall State Bar Association
Committee on Professional Ethics
Re: Inquiry No. 84-1: Disclosure of Confidential Communications
Dear Larry:
When we took our straw vote on this inquiry a couple of weeks ago, I
didn't fully realize how complicated this "Catch-22" situation is. After stud-
ying the Truly, Wright and Good proposed opinions and the reports of the
experts on child abuse, I am more perplexed than ever about how to vote. I
am glad we will be able to discuss the matter further at our next meeting.
290. See IJA/ABA STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE PARTIES
3.1(b) at 79-83 (1980).
291. Id at 82.
292. Mass. B.A. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 76-1 (1976).
Massachusetts General Law, chapter 119, section 21 defines a "child in need of serv-
ices" to include a child below the age of 17 who persistently runs away from home, or
persistently refuses to obey the lawful and reasonable commands of his parents or
guardians, or persistently and willfully fails to attend school, or persistently violates
lawful and reasonable school regulations.
Id
293. Id.
294. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.630 (West 1983).
Sec. 10. The court, in every case filed under this act in which judicial proceedings
are necessary, shall appoint legal counsel to represent the child. The legal counsel, in
general, shall be charged with the representation of the child's best interests. To that
end, the attorney shall make further investigation as he deems necessary to ascertain
the facts, interview witnesses, examine witnesses in both the adjudicatory and disposi-
tional hearings, make recommendations to the court, and participate in the proceed-
ings to competently represent the child.
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Here are some random thoughts that occurred to me as I pondered the draft
opinions.
(1) Allowing disclosure to be within the discretion of the parents' or
children's lawyers has some obvious advantages for lawyers in general, such
as providing for flexibility in assessment of the seriousness of the crime and
degree of harm likely to be inflicted. A lawyer cannot be disciplined for
making a bad judgment call. This is supported by a statement in the Scope
section of the Model Rules, "[t]he lawyer's exercise of discretion not to dis-
close information under Rule 1.6 should not be subject to reexamination.
Permitting such reexamination would be incompatible with the general pol-
icy of promoting compliance with law through assurances that communica-
tions will be protected against disclosure."
'295
On the negative side, lawyers exempt from discipline for failure to make
disclosure will be tempted to take the easy way out and never disclose, even
when the Code of Professional Responsibility grants them discretion to re-
veal future crimes. 296 They will pride themselves on their virtue in protect-
ing their client's confidences while ignoring their callous indifference to the
suffering of the weakest members of society, abused children.
(2) Another undesirable result of discretionary disclosure is that the
same set of facts will produce contrary results at the hands of individual
lawyers. The American public will see this as illogical and unconscionable.
Respect for law and our legal system will not be enhanced by such arbitrary
decision-making.
(3) If breach of confidentiality is a possibility, the question arises as to
whether the lawyer should advise his client of the possibility of disclosure at
the outset of representation. This question embodies what Professor Monroe
Freedman described as "Perjury: The Lawyer's Trilemma." The lawyer is
required "to know everything, to keep it in confidence, and to reveal it to the
court. '297 Some commentators have suggested that lawyers should give cli-
ents a "Miranda warning" that breach of confidentiality is a possibility.2 98
Yet, in effect, this is cautioning them "not to be completely candid, '299 and
treating them as "nonclients. ' ' 300 This approach to client perjury is used by
the Canadian bar.30' A similar "preventive solution" was suggested by a
pair of Florida lawyers who wrote, "The dilemma embodied in Canon 4...
is perplexing but not insoluble. Education of the client as to the boundaries
of the attorney-client privilege is the key to the problem. ' 30 2 This simplistic
approach would, in Professor Freedman's words, "take us out of the
trilemma by one door only to lead us back by another. '30 3 In other words,
295. MODEL RULES, supra note 185, at Scope.
296. ABA CODE, supra note 178, at DR4-101(C)(3).
297. Freedman, Perjuty: The Lawyr 's Tn'emma, I LITIGATION 26, (1975).
298. See, e.g., G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 50 (1978).
299. Freedman, supra note 297, at 29.
300. G. HAZARD, supra note 298, at 50.
301. Freedman, supra note 297, at 29.
302. Thomas & Barton, Ethical Dilemma: The Problem Posed by Canon 4, 3 FLA. B. CRIM. L.
NEWSLETTER 3 (June 1979).
303. Freedman, supra note 297, at 29.
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the lawyer would not "know everything" if his client withheld potentially
harmful facts for fear his lawyer would reveal them.
(4) Another question is whether silence on the lawyer's part as to the
damning information of his client's incestuous activity constitutes a decep-
tion on the court. The court needs all relevant information bearing on the
best interest and welfare of young, helpless children. By remaining silent,
the lawyer is allowing confidentiality to take precedence over his own hu-
manitarian impulses to help extricate an innocent third party from a harm-
ful and perhaps dangerous situation. Many laypersons would be shocked at
the lawyer's professionally-imposed callousness in keeping the information
secret.
Philosopher Sissela Bok would probably be shocked, as can be seen from
her writings, "[Tjhe bond of confidentiality can dim the perception of the
suffering imposed on outsiders .... "304 She recognizes, however, that in
making a promise, one sets up expectations, an equilibrium that is upset by
breaking the promise and failing to live up to these expectations, which is
unfair. 30 5 "[P]rofessional promises . . .are granted special inviolability so
that those who most need help will feel free to seek it."'30 6 Although she
cautions that promises must have limits,307 she advocates public debate to
set limits and standards for confidentiality and to increase knowledge about
what she considers to be "deceptive professional practices. ' 30 8 She recom-
mends that those affected should be included among the participants in the
debate.30 9 This philosophy makes one wonder whether laypersons were suf-
ficiently involved in the Kutak Commission public hearings on the Model
Rules.
(5) Let's assume the parents' lawyer decides that his duty is to reveal
their secret; how would he go about it? For one thing, he could tell the
parents that professional ethics require or permit, depending on whether the
language of the pertinent ethics code is mandatory or permissive, that he
reveal the information. In Marshall it is permissive. 3 10 (Should he have
advised them of this possibility at the outset before he received the informa-
tion, as discussed in my third question?) 3 1' The lawyer could suggest in his
advice to the child protection agency that the prosecutor or the court set up
an appropriate treatment program for the entire family which would be su-
pervised by the agency or the court. If the parents agree to cooperate and
participate in such a program, the prosecutor or the court might agree to
drop or suspend the neglect charges and to take no immediate action in
regard to the incest admission. With this kind of intervention and help it
might be possible to keep the family together and to spare the child the
further trauma of court proceedings and possible foster home or institutional
304. S. BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 150 (1978).
305. Id. at 152.
306. Id.
307. Id
308. Id. at 162-63.
309. Id at 98-106.
310. ABA CODE, supra note 178, at DR 4-101(C)(3).
311. See text immediately preceding note 297.
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care, or permanent parental severance. If this kind of help is not available or
the parents do not want it, then whether or not the lawyer should reveal,
depends on which of the three proposed opinions prevails.
I look forward to comments from other committee members before we






Although the State of Marshall and the individuals named in these
materials are purely fictional and bear no resemblance to persons living or
dead, the problems described occur. This item appeared in Newsweek on
January 23, 1984:
Punishing a Victim
After spending eight days in solitary confinement, a 12-year-
old girl named Amy was sent home last week by a California judge.
Her crime? Refusing to testify against her stepfather, a physician
charged with molesting her. How did authorities learn of the
crime? The family voluntarily sought help from a therapist who,
under state law, must report all cases of child abuse to the welfare
authorities. Will the father be punished? No, all charges were
dropped last week when Amy kept her silence. Now, can the family
begin therapy? Yes. As Amy has learned, home isn't the only
place where a child can be abused.
3 12
312. Punishtng a Victim, Newsweek, Jan. 23, 1984, at 70, col. 3.
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